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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STA'rE OF UTAH
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BRENT CRISCOLA,
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Case No. 11092
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

=========
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Danny Brent Criscola appeals
rro~:1

his conviction for the crime of Burglary in

the Second Degree in violation of Section 76-9-3,
i

I Ute;;--,

Code Annotated, 1953, and Grand Larceny in

viol6tion of Section 76-38-1 and Section 76-38-4,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, upon jury trial in the
TI1ird Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County

of Utc:ih, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft pre-

:c~:;:::c

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with the crimes of
3un;lary in tJ1e Second Degree and of Grand Larceny
i:1 the District Court of the Third Judicial District,

Lake County, State of Utah, on April 20, 1967.

30~t

was arraigned and a plea of not guilty entered.

:~c

by jury was corrunenced on June 29, 1967, and

~~ial

co~cluded
~i·e

on the same day.

After presentation of

evidence the appellant was found guilty of second

•C:egree burglary and grand larceny and Judge Bryant
~.

Croft entered judgment on the verdict on June 30,

:967, sentencing the appellant to an indeterminate
cerr.1 of one to twenty years on the burglary conviction
c.:-:-

!
I

..-1e to ten years on the grand larceny conviction.

hppellant was corrunitted to the Utah State Prison on
July S, 1967.

,~e

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPF.AL
The appellant submits that the conviction should
dismissed, or in the alternative that the conviction

I ~:-iould

I

be reversed and a new trial granted.
-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At about 10:30 p.m. on January 11, 1967, George
2:,11:;_;1ger, an employee of the Highland Petroleum
Company, (incorporated as Automotive Safety Service
i:;-;c., located at 2892 Highland Drive in Salt Lake
City) closed his business.

He testified that he put

~: 1e

cash in the safe, locked and checked the doors

CLlG

:eft the premises about 10:45 p.m. (Tr. 56,

57, 58).

At about 2:00 a.m. on January 12, 1967, Michael
\·J.

i-lanks, a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputy was

i~

tne vicinity of Zenith Avenue and Highland Drive

\'..:'r. 79, 80).

He saw a car with a lone occupant,

(who he later ascertained was one Richard Hamilton)
8 3 ) , 'parked with its motor running, next to
1

tte 3eefeaters Restaurant located at that intersection
(~r.

80).

He pulled along side the car in his police

vehicle and asked Hamilton for an explanation of his
presence.

Hamilton replied that he was waiting for

someone inside the restaurant (Tr. 80).

-3-

Deputy

:·"~."J(S

the:! r;iade out a field report on the car, noting

was a 1957 Ford, license number CJ 1670 (Tr. 81).
... , ~ ..c::-ning to the area three or four minutes
c~r

..

He

co:ltacted the sheriff's dispu.tcher and arranged

•.::~

~o

he discovered the car was gone (Tr. 80).

>.ave a Salt Lake City patrol car meet him (Tr. 81),
soon tr.ereafter he met with Officer David M.

~~J

I ~::-::..c.-.:-..01 t
i

~c,,_o

'

~c

of the Salt Lake City Police Department,

nim of tY1e suspicious car, and advised Brienhol t

d-.eck the buildings in the area, which were in

c:i'.c cit:y jurisdiction by about one block (Tr. 82)o
:J.c::y-.:ty Eanks then parked his car near 33rd South and
:<::..gl':iland Drive from where he noticed the same car
:;_:ii;'lg east on 33rd South with three occupants, whom
~.2

could not identify (Tr. 84).

He did not there-

u:ter see the vehicle (Tr. 83).
Cfficer Brienholt testified that he followed
•.i~·c:

tracks in the newly fallen snow from the area

;;ccx'c.

to the Beefeaters Restaurant to an area on

~.t.K:ir,

Avenue where he saw footprints where someone

-4-

...:::;')i)Llrently alighted from the car.
~·~~0

He followed

to the front door of the Highland Petroleum

:o~ .;Jeiny

..- ::1c

(Tr. 86) •

He checked the doors and windows

station, but could find no signs of entry or

·.'1~ doors

(Tr. 86).

Officer Brienholt testified

... c.t he could see nothing out of order inside the
1

oc0::ion and that the night lights were on, but that
:.e could not see the safe from his position outside
~:~2
~..)

station (Tr. 88, 89).

At about this time he

ciced a car fairly closely matching the description

, :Jc:ty Hanks had given him pulling out of Crandall

.:.venue on to Highland Drive with three occupants,
:.o:-,e of which he could identify (Tr. 86, 8 7) •
:o~lowed

He

tracks in the snow down Crandall Avenue

co see if he could ascertain where the car had been,
:~cting

that there were only one set of tracks in

c;,e new snow on that street.

He followed these

.::-c,c>:s dovm Crandall Avenue to 12th East and found
c_.:o places where the car had apprently stopped and

:.;c:;,eone had alighted.

From one of these two stopping

-5-

0ces there were footprints leading up Zenith Avenue

jo

~;1e back of the station (Tr. 87).

He saw no one

:oot in the area and did not see the car again
83).

2Ggene Baker, an employee of Highland Petroleum
brother of the station owner, arrived at the

,u

stac.=;_on at about 7:05 a.m. on January 12, 1967, to
the station for business (Tr. 61).

2~en

He noticed

Jn entering the station's office that the safe door
ajar (Tr. 62).

:-iis brother, the owner, (Tr. 71).

:i:',C.

s2o..rc~ed

He then

the station for signs of entry and could

none (Tr. 63, 64).

~~r.c

:.e

He called police, (Tr. 62),

After the officers arrived

took an inventory and found six quarts of 20

.:'c.

Pennzoil motor oil and one Lee oil filter model
to be missing (Tr. 64).

~:;_.,::_,

Both items were

1c.c;z:-iowledged as being common i terns for sale in many

=·2c:-vice stations and businesses (Tr. 68)

o

He

i_ci,:::ntified the type of oil missing to be the same
t];)e

''""

as the six cans of oil of state's exhibit

~er

six, and the filter missing to be the same

-6-

c

that of state's exhibit number seven.

He

;'ot determine the amount of money missing (Tr.

,,~•,,

'"'~

LIS

Ee testified that the night lights were still

1.

, ,, 0.:1<.

th3.t t.i1ere was no other damage except that

~o

the safe and to the inside door to the office

i.:--:

\·k;ich the safe was located (Tr. 66).

Ronald Baker,

ovmer and manager, on his arrival soon after his

t:~e

";:i.:_"o ::::-.er' s call, checked to see how much money was
r.._:_ssi;-ig and found the· amount to be over $200.00

On the following day, January 13, 1967, Officer
'2hor.:as
p2~

w.

Brown, of the Salt Lake City Police De-

bnent saw the appellant driving in a car at about

Fou.cth South and Second
.~3vi:-.g

information that his driver's license was

;~,~;:;er.ded,

\~.co

East, followed him, and

stopped him at about 360 East 9th South

90, 91).

Appellant was driving a 1957 Ford,

l.,_c(::;--,se number CJ 1670 (Tr. 91).

Officer Brown asked

to see his driver's license and appellant produced

a mutilated Colorado driver's license.

-7-

Officer

.= L·c\n:

i'lsked appellant if he was aware that his

c'::;.-::..vcr' s license was suspended and appellant stated
' t;1u. t ti1is was impossible as he had been in Colorado
, for c.wo years.

At that time Officer Brown arrested

o'.))Cllant for driving with a suspended driver's
license, handcuffed him, placed h.lln in the police
ar.d then called a wrecker and impounded his

c~~,

vehicle (Tr. 91).
Then Officer Brown searched the car before it
was hauled away, at the scene of the arrest, removing
the vehicle six cans of Pennzoil, an oil filter,

fro~

a

~x

with some old spark plugs in it and a black

k;:,::_ t: sweater,
a~c

(Tr. 91).

He placed the cans of oil

the filter in plastic bags, sealed them and placed

t:--,err, along with the old spark plugs and sweater in the

evidence room at the Police Station (Tr. 92).

Officer

Brown testified that there was nothing else in the
car at the t.llne (Tr. 92).

He identified the oil

and filter as state's exhibits numbers six and
seven (Tr. 91).

-8-

3o1mie Cc.mpbell, an acquaintance of the appellant
~,,;'cificd

that at about 4:30 p.m. on January 13, 1967,

<'i~cllu.nt

asked her to take and keep some tools for

•'-''

., as he U1ought the police mignt come to his
\·Jith a warrant looking for them, and he didn't

:.0~.-.0

.. ::;~-c therr, to be found there (Tr. 95).

She further

ccstified that the tools he gave her appeared to

I ~e:

t=i.ose comprising state's exhibits eight and nine

98).

(~~.

'';jec.

She took them and placed them under a

ir, her ap2xtment (Tr. 95).
Susan Johnson Hand, a roommate of Miss Campbell,

testified that she saw the tools under the bed near
e~d

of January (Tr. 100, 101).

Helga Landau, another roommate, testified that
s;;e: also saw the tools under the bed (Tr. 102),

c.nC. -c:10. t about 7 : 3 0 or 8 : 00 p .m. on February 23,

(

appellant and another man, unknown to her,

~0G7,
:::c~:.e
.-.• c

to the apartment, the appellant saying that

>.. ,d

coiT.e to get his tools, whereupon the appellant

'"';'"' "riis campanion went into the bedroom and left
c;-,,c- C.~)artment

shortly. thereafter carrying a bundle

-9-

·,

~:J~,

103).

•~ ~:;_s

·c._;_:··1'2

and his testimony was substantially the

~·:i~.. c

as i"iiss Landau's except that he saw the appel-

Paul Wright was also present at

ca;:rying a sledge hanuner from the apartment

':'>,e companion of appellant at the time the tools
\·.·ere rerr,oved from the apartment, Michael Heidrich,
tes~ified
.:::.~.u-:~er

that appellant took a crowbar and sledge

from under the bed, then Heidrich went out

to -.:he car and fell asleep, not seeing the appellant
;:::l.ace the tools in the car (Tr. 118, 119).
On the following day, February 24, 1967, Officer
Cu.y

~·J.

Blunk of the Salt Lake City Police Department,

responded to a call from a fellow officer.

The

lc:..tter having announced that he had stopped a violc:.. tor.

When Officer BlW1k arrived on the scene

;::;-;e other officer informed him that he was going to
~rrest ~~e
co~~g

po~~ce

appellant for a traffic violation, and

so, placed appellant in the other officer's
car, requesting Officer Blunk to maintain

-10-

: - .:;.:;

c~-·C"Vrol0t

s tc:ct::..on

WCl<JOn

registered to Viichael
'I'he other

scene 11:1--c:n che appellant in

o.nd

a tool chest,

\-,,;ith r ..ota-Cior.is of the tirae, Gate, place and

~-.-=2;,-,.::;
~.~s

rer~,oved

::_..",i tic.ls; p:c.ced b1em in his police car, and

c_:csi~ed

t~e~

in the police evidence room on his

ac -c..-.e pol:i.ce s'cc:tion ('.L'r. 109) o
c~

He test-

cross-exar:lination that the sledge hammer

crcwbar were not in plain sight, but were on
vehicle partially under the seat
ccvered with the coat ('=1r. 110).
C~~:c::cer
~.:,::_ice

Dave Bradford, of the Salt Lake City

I!2partrr,2~1t

testified that he investigated the

::_20) and exo:nined the general premises and the

Ge

tes~ified

that he could find no point
-11-

:?.B.I.,

by Officer 3radford, and the
___ v

_,__;o.r, c..1-.C: a_s a
.'~--u.,
2::._ -:.12r
__ -.2

res~-=-- t

-;:ro.--:-, -c,-;e

-

..L ... .:.

sou.cce a_s the paint samples

a.

s~miliar

hlorti1er with the same

::__29), :Out::._;-, l-:is opinion the possibility

la~ter

:;

su;~,e

?etrole-c1m Company or another

.-.::._s-:-:~c.::_c

(r;:·r~

-:.-:e: pc:._i::-.t deposit on the crowbar

~•·G'-

-

of -G"lis exarnination was

~as

remote

:;_30).

_
S:'.:IZJ.::CS OF A Ci=<OWBl,R AND SLEDGE
.-.:,;_:_:__..C::G_-; :.'.-.S =:L:;:,;:;c;,:,L U~;JZR '1.'H2 CONSTITUTION

S~~._:, _:,c::;___~.::Jr

-12-

-~~

~-2

cailse, ?~eston

Vw

United States, 376

U.s:

case do not come

<:>,ere:Oy obtained should have been ex,-...

.

- _. -

,..-

\........1.._ ........ ..___-...:.1..-.

w

r::·~~,e

stat2

~~o~~~:e

:: :::,;:- -:.-.e i
-~ ~c._-,_-::;ec

-:=:-.e

c:1in, 367 U.S. 643,

v

I-'i'S')Y)

ap~aren-C.ly

(1961).

makes no claim that i t

cause to stop appellant's car and search
ti~..2s

seized, ::..ns tead, appellant was

fo.c a -c:rG.ffic violation, arrested, the car

circt:.T,s-C.a:;ces here clearly do not justify

s --::~. .:-en a:-lG seizure of toe crowbar and sledge

-13-

Appellant

3S

:.. _-:_-cs ceci. for a t-caffic violation, placed in one
_: ~ ic---:~ · s car, c.:-"d while ot1 l--:is way, or possibly

a:rived

'·~

L

-

the police station, the second

sc::.rted tl12 search of appellant's car which

_-::._c,-~;:

c.:, -c:-.e

seizure of evidence of a crirr,e unrelated
arres-c was made (Tr. 108,

_._,

~-..

\

~')

':.:'::--.e j

...

L~s

Cifica tions for a search incident to

.s \.·as stated in ?res ton v

2
•

ff

United States.

367:

wl;en a person is lc.wfully
the police hc.ve the right, without a
se..:.rch warrc:mt, to make a conter<,·-:ioraneous
of the person of D.1e c.ccused for weapons
c~ ::or t>ie
frui'cs of or imple~ents used to
right to search and
crirae"
:::eize wi'cho-u.c a search warrant extends to things
_:-r.::':'c'.:c ':_>2 c,ccuse_::i 1 s i_lVnediate control, and,
co CI1 e::,.;:-ce::r:t depc.1dir.g on tne circumstances
of the case, to the place where he is arrestedo
:-S-=--£::;=-:-~__'.':'._l~_0' ~-'G contemporaneous searches
_ _'.~_':·~~_ti:=i~c::i _..fo'-:.__~xc:m0le, :!Jv the need to seize
· ~<--= c
2_:n,d otl-·cr -cicinc:s which mic:ht :Je used
3}__~cos 'C-c:,==--c n -~ off:i_cer or effect. an escape, as
~~ 2s ::-.i'' tf-e cced to -::irevent destruction of
,,-,:: -.:.:~~cf ~c:r,e c:-irr.2--things whici1 might
c~s~ly ha~pc~ where the weapon or evidence
i~ c~ ~he accu:::e0 1 s person or t.;nder his irrunediate
'-:J:i~estionally 1

CC'.'res~ed,

1 ,,-:
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I
---·---->"•

-~::.__---~----

-,_~ __
~:__.\_\,~(~:.L~-~~-------~c__,._

__

______c_--_-_.. _. "

• ""----'°~'-"-'

:_,~1ce

------·-~·

is s

i_:corll

J-J~:1J_l~y_1_-._o_-_:___i_·_r.._c_i_·_d_e_:i_,__-;__
--

\ .=:npi10sis aC::C:Ceci.. )

:..r1 tr.e :? 0 eston case were str-ikingly

seurci1 of the appellant's car,
In Preston
3cc11sed were arrested
\·.·

~--:..---!~

~J

state officers for

t:c..ke;1 ir.to custody, and their car searched
'::.\1e evidence seized at that time

against L.r..e::. on a c:r1c..rge unrelated to trie

-~sed

T~e

.:.c...:..rct: was
~-...:- ...:-:::;;-.::

J..-c

•''-'~

court concluded that since

inciderY!:. to arrest and without

:::'aiJ.eC. to meet the Foucth Arnendment

..::-e.--:.cerir-.g the evidence inadmissible.
the search of a;ipellant's car is claimed to

• ·. _ ...:,:.er. me.de L-:..c:::.dent to impm.md 7 rather than

. .::::.~--=.;-.t c:o arrest, the qc.;.estio:::--1 then arises as to
exception to the warrant
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Cali::'orni2, 386
•

,

_,v

I -

(I~

\..l...JU

r-7'
i

1

..,

officers arrested defendar,t
rr!
a "'~

Th8 Supreme Court
- ':._s searc:1 legal on -the ground that the impound-

-CC'--·-·

~'---'
2

-::.rans)ort narcotics should be held, as evidence,
~orfei'cure

~- "J __ o ::_ c'.ing

was declared or a release ordered.

·c:--.e sear ch, U1e court distinguished

v, L:::-1i ~=C: Scc;·tes, supra, where no such statute

'·

-for the nature of the custody
justify the search. Preston
\<'C.S arrested for vagrancy.
An arresting officer
-coo;-c "nis car to U1e station rather than just
::.2avi~g it en the street.
It was not suggested
-c;~"::.t ~-:is was done ot>.er than for Pres ton's
cor-.veni21xe or tha-i: -che police had aI1y right
c:.o L:.po-~'lci the co.r anc-, kee) it from ::?reston or
,_.,~--;.cmc::ver :--ce I1ti<:::,:1t senC: :for ito
The fact that
-c,,e police had cus-tody of Preston's car was
totally w.re::_c.ted to the vagrancy charge for
'--~--:icri t::-cy v.2:_c:e arrested.
So was the subsequent
sc~c:-1 o-Z _ the car..
'.L':1is case (Cooper) was
:-.o-t .?re.ston, r.or is ic:. controlled by it.
~-

-=..;

• -Che

reaso~1

c~_si:itvc:ionally
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'

-

L

-·~-~~--__ __,___·:.-__,._::_~, _ ,n~:_~~ _::.-·?~c L-.j_r(~(~ ~(-

s·C2tf__:

"j_r-i:}_u

\'r s--=~~LZCLc i-c 02co-use o:C L.l--:.e c.:ciITLe for ;J~i.ich

'---- 1~y

p2ti .'.-=.ior1er ~ rr>J_2y seized it to
G·.-.d chey huCi to kee) it ur1til for-

,::-~r.L-c.s-ced

:~,,.,:)O'L;~1c1

:~t

=:_=c;.i_·CL·_:_-c

:=;J:-oce:c>__.~

".. gs \Vere

col1.c:~dec1-A

Tl-:ej_r

::::: ...·ch of the car--•.v:-ietner tt-.e state
· -l
; :-...ecj;:i:;_ ::::_Cl\.::'
-~~o it or r,o c--was closely
-.~~._:J1:ec -~~n
\-,-,,-. cc.~Lsor1 f· 1 ~··=·i_tior1e.c 1.1as arrested,
-~ rec.;.;o, 1 \1is cc...c ha Ci been impounded, and the
"~2c.soy1 i_·c was beirn; retai;:iedo"
Cooper v. Cal• ·"' - '."'."i."'
supra at 61 (Emphasis added. )
:=:·.;:.~.:;,:::c:,c.:.er.'c

L·

·che Cooper exception.

T:r1e search

\·:c..s ::-.ot ;::-elatec ·co the reason appellant was

:.2~2

~~~ested:

to

or to tl'1e reason the car was impounded 1

~he rec.so~

tne car was being retained.

The

·c>,at the police had custody of appellant's
L

-

,;:.s c.:.rirelc..·ced to 'che traffic violation he was

·--~~..:;·cec. for,

exceLJt insofar as the arrest caused

..:....:. ~o :..nvollli1ta.rily
s .:.~ee·c~

11

abandon" his car on a public

T:1ere is no suggestion that arrest for a

~.cc..::::'::Eic viclatio.n subjects the violator's car to

~v~::Eeiture, or that state law specifically requires

the impounding of appellant's
:-.2.r-e was of t11e "ca.r-etaking" type and does not
·-~~~:;:y ·u....-ide.c tne special exception of Coooer.
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·'~ ..::,i:1 ;ilain sight cccorci.ix19 to tL2 testimony of the

c - -_ce:::
~-·~·'--"

~· 2''

\Jl-'10

..:.~2

made the .:;e::..."ci', but were slid partially

seat

0 . .c,

covered with a coat (Tr. 110).

..:'.~us

cc.:-.lco·c be legally seized under the rationale

---~.s

v., Un"_tec States, 370 F. 2d 477 (D.C. Cir.

'..''.~i_ch

lJermi·..:ted evidence readily seen while the

.Jc·-..:.:-.C.ir.c; o::fficer was rolling up windows of the
.c ...:.:".C.ed vehicle in a "caretaking" type impound
A sledge hammer is not

_ -=...:.:::·;lex -cool as defined under Section 76-9-82,
v.:.~~

CoC.e Anr..O'Cated, 1953, nor was there any facts

w>..::.ch

it cou::.c. :Oe concluded that appellant's

_-c:::session of -che

crow~ar

and sledge hammer were for

::: .:._c.'1io·u.s purposes o
'::'i-.2 general searcn of ar, automobile incident
~~affic

c

arrest has generally been held improper.

0~~

Seizace Incident to Traffic Violations,

.. _::..lia.11.ette Law Journal 247 (1967).
:=n the Ut1:l_ted States ex rc:l Kroc;ness v. Gladden,
.,
~

.

~99

(D.C. Ore. 1965), United States
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,:;::_s CL'ict

Cou.::-~

:Cor the District of Oregon granted

'" c:. cio:ie_c u writ of habeas corpus under cir'--

=.·;:c;;--,ces co:T,!:Xlrable to those in the instant case.
Has arrested for a traffic violation

~··~'

~::,2c.itioner

- ~(j

c:<e C'lG'.'estin<J officer reCO<JDized him as having

0

:o:~ce

record.

Subsequently, other officers arrived

see:-.::

c:.:-.c. '.Jec.;ions were seized which were linked to a burc;=.c.::y whicr, Has previously cormni tted.

The Oregon

has previously affirmed the conviction
·c::,e grou;-.ds that the officers had reasonable
cc.·c:s2

L:O

believe 'che car was carrying contraband,

'.:'.',3 O::e. 135, 388 P. 2d 120 (1964).
cc.-~::

The federal

hm1ever, 9ranted the writ finding no relation;::,2tween the arrest and the search.

:=...1 ·che instant case there is no evidence to
s~;;ort

a determination that the officer had any

::_ ·.::c.c:.-,ation when he stopped the vehicle for the
c.::c.ff:i.c violation that it contained any contraband.
-19-

··:::.::0r, the i cems seized were not contraband, but

.'c

..· ~ ~::..:'

;=iossib~c

evidence.

The Federal Court in

·,·,· ·e:s no<=eec cnat the search of the vehicle
,·,::s ;:: · t

relac:ed to the traffic violation, but was

·"' ,:::·...:..:.·cly exploratory seizure wi>ich was u..'1.reasonw:i.thout probc:'ble cause."

.~ c~::d
~

_

.: ·

:::.::c.t a s.::c: :c:::
-=-:;~

Many courts have

in r.ature accompanied

exp=.orator~r

a::rest for traffic offenses is unlawful.

"-=~=c:·:s

un:L·=ed States, 289 F. 2d 129 (Sill Cir.

\T.

1%2.);; 2'2'1.1<:i::.s v, State, 232 Md. 529, 194 Atl. 2d

SlS (l9S3);

v

!.pp. 1962 ) •

C:.::'...~,ir.c.::.
~e:z-.·~e

3ro~m

State, 358

s.w.

2d 388 (Tex.

See al so Simeone, Search and

Inci.ceCJ.t to Traffic Violations, 6 St. Louis

c,..,iversi'.::y Law Journal 506 (1961); note Search and
S-::2.ze,:re Incident to Traffic ViolatioY'ls, 1959 Wis.
~.

Rev. 347; Tiffany, Mcintyre & Rotenberg, Detection

c~ Cri.'"'.'e,

(1967) pp. 132-133.

Consequently in this

:..:.:::·::;c.:1ce w}<ere the arrest of the appellant was wholly
·~·...::-e:::..o.ted

to any need to search the vehicle it is
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c):..wious that t:-,::_s search cannot be sustained.

The

0iJ)ellan-c was already in custody and away from the
sc12;1e w

T!1ere was no need for searching the vehicle

for

protection of the officer.

~~e

Second, there

'-'. .:.-::; :-.o indicat::.o;-1 the vehicle contained contraband.
-.:!-,ere \-.-as no basis to search for evidence
::_:-iStnlJT,entalities by which the crime for which
~,))ellant

was arrested was committed.

Absent

.:;.ese essentials there was no basis on which the
search could be justified.
Recently this court in State v. Chestnut, # 10638
Fejruary 6, 1968, sustained a search incident to an
-:_.~-..::-e:st

even though it appeared to be a traffic arrest •

.-_.: , 2-.-e:r i
~ .. .:

this case is clearly distinguishable from

::"acts of the ins tar. t case s :i.nce it involved an
of driving under .::-.,-' i:-.fluence of intoxicating
and a search was made ::_n the presence of the

c~:~~dants.

0::

A search of a vehicle after the arrest

a )erson for operating the vehicle under the

_:_:-.:.:'h.:ence of intoxicating liquor can be justified
-21-

~

c).:oper search for liquor or empty bottles from

~

v.. ~.::._ch

t.t'le intoxicant may have been consumed.

::'"ore, the Ches tn1 i- case .::._.
:rom the

ir~tant

There-

readily distinguished

case.

Appellant, therefore, submits that the facts
o~

-

thi~

case do not qualify under the special ex-

ce:.=i-:::io:-. of

C;;~~'

that the search was not incident

cev::..c2 ·:::o per::,::._ t a general search to seize evidence

for

~.-.a-cching

purposes in an attempt to connect

le.:-.-::: wi.-ch tr,e crime.
~estrai~t
.:~·.2;..·e

The traffic arrest bei:lc;

o.;:;?e~a

to artifice to search appellant's car,

:Oeing no evidence sufficient to obtain a

\,•c.::-~·c.::i:.

Appellant further contends therefore, that

c.s i:: ?reston, the search and seizure was illegal
::::-_C. t:-:.e evidence gained thereby should have been
exc:~ -..;.C.ed,

Mapp v, c·

~-o,

supra.

?urther, even if the search

could be justified,

,:;eizure of the i·:::ems could not.
sleC:.c;e hammer are not contraband.
-22-

A crowbar and
'I',1eir possession

i.3 ;-:ot per se illegal.

The officer had no information

1/,1.ich would connect these items to a crime except
speculationo

Consequently, the seizure of these

ite;,1s was itself illegal.

It is well recognized

chat even though there may be legal justification
~or

a search and seizure of items absent showing that

the ite:-ns seized are contraband or that there is
probable cause to believe that they were connected
-.- :: c_-il<',e the seizure of the evidence
i

cannoc: be justified.

In Davis, Federal Searches

' 2nd Seizure, it is stated with reference to ~he

seizure of items:
"For convenience of reference, this list may
be shortened to: (1) Means and instruments
of co~~itting a criminal offense, (2) Fruits
of crime, (3) Weapons of escape, and,
(4)
Contraband.
"In order to be legallv seizable, property
must f2ll within one of the categories listed
a::::>ove. This is true even though the search
a..1d seizure is legally justified and lawfully
conducted. Of course, once articles are legally
seized, they must be offered as evidence to
prove criminal charges." (Emphasis added.)
Failure of the trial court to exclude the iliegally obtained evidence was not harmless error.
-23-

.-.s co the standard for harmless error the United
::>-;;ates

Supreme Court has held it to be

11

•••

\·1::ether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to
t.1e co:---.viction."
00,

Fahy Vo Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,

11 L. Ed. 2d 171, 84 S. Cto 229 (1963).

Clearly

wit;1out the illegally seized evidence the conviction
of the appellant could not have occurred.
Appellant recognizes that the search and seizure
:-.ere co::-.;::ilained of was not objected to at trial,
.:ic:t contends that this court must nonetheless consider the issue on the merits.
~'

In Henery v. Mississ-

379 U.S. 443, (1965), the United States Supreme

Court held that state procedural requirements could
r.ot defeat the petitioner's federal constitutional
rights unless it could be determined that,

11

•

o •

c=ter consultations with competent counsel or other·.;ise (the petitioner) understandingly and knowingly
fo.cewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his
federal claims in the state courts, whether for
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strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can
~e ~airly

described as deliberate by-passing of state

procedures."
~bre

(Emphasis added• )

recently in Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.

1, Cl966), the court held that "(T)he question of
c. waiver of a federally guaranteed constitutional

right is, of course, a federal question to be controlled
by

federal law.

There is a presumption against the

waiver of constitutional rights • • • and for a
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established
that tnere was an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."

(Emphasis

added.)
Appellant's contention here that there was no
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right at trial is borne out by the record which
discloses no knowledge by the appellant of a privilege
or right to object to the illegal search and seizure,
as the federal claims were never raised at trialo
Tims, certainly there was no knowing and understanding
waiver or intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of his federal claims.
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'.::'he Supreme Court in Henery v. Mississippi,
su~ra,

notes friction between state and federal

cm.:rts arising out of federal habeas corpus and again
as ::_ t did in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,

(1963),

c.;-.c extended to t.'!e state courts an invitation to

']:'._Ve _:-,;11 attention to federal claims in state courts,
~i--.us

:-r.inimizing the need for federal habeas corpus

and the resultant friction.
Appellant submits the failure to object cannot
~recluoe

consideration of the issue.

POIJ\J'T II
i

r;:'HE JURY INSTRUCTION BY THE TRIAL COURT AS
LARCENY WAS WHOLLY INADEQUATE, OMITTING THE
SSSENTIAL ELEi"1ENTS OF THAT OFFENSE, AND SHOWED
?LAIN AND PALPABLE ERROR ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD
TO TP.E ~JANIFEST DETRIMENT OF APPELLANT.
'l'J

Appellant contends the instruction given to
foe jury as to Grand Larceny (Instruction No. 15,
Tr. 39) is wholly inadequate in that it omits what
is generally the essential elements of the crime.

The trial court's instruction stated as the essential
elements of the crime of grand larceny as follows:
-26-

"l. That on or about the 12th day of January,
1967, the defendant, Danny Brent Criscola,
stole personal property of Automotive Safety
Service Incorporated.
"2.

That such stealing was felonious.

That said personal property had value in
excess of $50.00 when so stolen.
"3.
:-

That said acts occurred in Salt Lake County,

State of Utah. "

(Tr. 3 9 ) •

Generally the essential elements of the crime
are

cor~idered

to be; first, that the taking or

carrying away was without the owner's consent or
:rnoi:Jl edge; second, that the taking was done with the

intention to permanently appropriate such property
to the taker's use; and third, that the taker intended
to permanently deprive the owner of possession of
the property.
(7~

Clark and Marshall, Crimes, p. 825

Ed. 1962); A. E. Bronson, The Law of Instructions

to Juries § 3916 (3rd Ed. 1962).
The instruction gave only general advice that
fr,e jury must find that the "stealing was felonious"
which in addition to omitting the essential elements
of the offense, would be practically devoid of
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r112~;ning

to a jury without further explanation.

As

stated by this court on the sufficiency of a larceny
instruction:
"· •• defendant urged that the court erred
in instructing the jury that 'if the defendant
was an inmate of the penitentiary at the time
of the larceny, serving out a sentence of a
competent court, and that he took the horse
in question for the purpose of escaping, that
would be larcenyo' This charae, taken by itself,
und disconnected from that which followed, might
be subject to the objection made; but we find
the court charqed the jury correctly in defining
larceny; and also charged the jw:y that before
they could convict, 'they must find, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the defendant feloniously
took and rode away the horse in question, with
~nt to deprive the owner thereof of the~
oHnershiD and use of the horse; and that there
ouqht to be a union of act and intent in every
criminal offense. That the taking must have
been without any intent of returning the same,'
etc. Taking ._the charge as given, as a whole,
we find no error in the instructions given."
People v. Flynn, 7 Utah 378 at 379., 26 P. 1114
(1891). (Emphasis added.)
The instruction given by the court as to larceny
in appellant's trial seems to be plainly insufficient
by the standards of this court and the generally
accepted standards of legal authority.
It appears from the record that no exception
was taken to the instruction here complained of at

-28-

trial, but that has been held not to bar this court's
consideration of claims of error when there is plain

.

0nd palpable error on the face of the record in
instructions given or refused.

State v. Cobo, 90

Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936); State v. Waid, 92 Utah
297, 67 P. 2d 647 (1937).

The instruction given

in this case was totally devoid of any explanation
of the elements of the offense, and completely
inadequate.

Therefore, the appellant's conviction

for grand larceny should be reversed.
POINT III
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE APPELLANT WAS DRIVING
ATrn THE SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE OJL AND OIL FJLTER
THEREFROM WERE ILLEGAL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.
ThE

The search complained of here was more nearly
like the traditionally allowed search incident to
arrest than the search which yielded the crowbar
and sledge hanuner as appellant was present at the
time of this search.

However, the circumstances

surrounding the search here complained of do not
provide the common justifications for search incident
to arrest set out in Preston v. United States, supra,
-29-

as

a~)pellant

was handcuffed and sitting in the arresting

o:ficer's patrol car (Tr. 91), at the time the search

wCJ.s carried out, and was in no sense in "immediate
control" of the vehicle being searched, posed no
danger to the safety of the officer or to the preservation of any evidence.

Further, under Preston,

the seizure of fruits and instrumentalities is
limi~ed

to those of the crime for which the arrest

is made or contraband.

The items seized were in

no way "fruits or instrumentalities" of the traffic
offense for which appellant was arrested nor known
coutraband at the time seized.
Appellant further submits that the search was,
by itself, unreasonable as it was made by the util-

ization of a sham arrest, the arrest beJ.9g used as
a pretext in an attempt to overcome his Fourth Amendrr:ent right of privacy in the absence of probable
cause.
It is apparent from the record that the police
were without probable cause to search as they found

it necessary to resort to the artifice of arresting
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3p~ellant

for a traffic offense in order to accom-

plish the search.
The fact that the arrest was made the day after
the perpetuation of the crime for which appellant
was eventually convicted, the fact that appellant
was arrested on that day for a continuing type of
offense (driving on a suspended license), and the fact
that

t.~e

same device was used twice in appellant's

case, both times producing evidence tending to
connect him with the same unrelated offense, provides
an irrebutable inference that this arrest was no
happy coincidence for the police resulting from
ro~tine

traffic enforcement, but was indeed used as

a pretext to achieve the end of searching appellant's
vehicle.

-

A search cannot be justified retroactively by
what it turns upo

State v. Hoover, 219 Ore. 288 9

347 Po 2d 69 (1959)0

The cans of oil and oil filter seized were inoccuous common items of independent brand, which could
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be found for public sale at many establishments.
They were not contraband per se.
"An arrest may not be used as a pretext to

search for evidence."

Search and seizures made incident

to such arrests may be held violative of Fourth
Amendment rights.

u.s.

United States v. Lefkowitz, 285

452, 467 (1932).
"Even if (the) arrest were legal, it would not

legalize the seizure of evidence found • • • since
the arrest was incident to the seizure and not the
seizure incident to the arrest.
to ends, not ends to means.

Means are incident

It is settled law that

when it appears • • • that the search and not the
arrest for the real object of the officers • • • and
that the arrest was a pretext for, or at the most
an incident of the search.

The search is not rea-

sonable within the meaning of the constitution."
McKnioht v. United States, 183 F. 2d 977, 979, 978
(U.s.c.A.

D.C. 1950).

"Instead of the search being incidental to the
arrest • • • the arrest was incidental to if not
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0

mere pretext for the search.

The question is

whether a search made under such circumstances vio1 ates the constitutional rights of the defendant.
\'IC

think it does."

12 F. 2d 528

(4~

Henderson v. United States,

Cir. 1926).

Several state courts have spoken out specifically
against the practice of using traffic violation
arrest as pretexts for search and seizure.

"Where

the primary purpose of an arrest appears to have
~een

a pretext for making an unrelated, exploratory

search of the defendant, or his car, the search is
not justified."

Riddlehoover v. State, 198 So. 2d

651 (D.C.A. Fla. 1967)0

The Michigan Court concerning

arrests for traffic violations held that " • • • a
search, if othel:'\</ise illegal because it is made without probable cause is not rendered lawful by • • • (an)
arrest."

People v. Zeigler, 353 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.

Zil. 456 (1960).
The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that,
" ••

o

it has been made clear that courts will not

sanction a 'pretended' arrest where a police officer
-33-

being suspicious of some particular individual,
observes him until a time when he can be arrested
on some traffic violation and then under the hoped
for protection of the arrest searches in an attempt
to find something incriminating, which will lead to
a charge having nothing to do with the original
arrest."

Whitleg v. State, 418 P. 2d 164 (Wyoo 1966).

The recent holding by this court in State Vo
Chestnut, supra, can be distinguished here also as
it deals with an arrest for driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor which is widely recognized as
a justifing means for searching for evidence of the
offense, that being one of the few traffic offenses
which will reasonably justify a search for tangible
evidence in.side the car.

State v. Taft, 110 S.E. 2d

727 (W. Va. 1959); State v. Giles, 119 S.E. 2d 394
(N.C. 1961); State v. Howard, 23 S.W. 2d 10 (Mo.
1929); State v. Padgett, 316 Mo. 179, 289 S.W. 954
(1926).
As to any claim that the oil and oil filter
were validly seized incident to impound, the same
-34-

authorities which applied in Point I are applicable
here, and appellant submits they are despositive
of that ground.
The search and seizure thus being violative of
appellant's Fourth Amendment rights they should have
been excluded at trial.

Mapp v. Ohio, supra.

As to appellant's failure to object to the
introduction of the illegally seized evidence at
trial on the above grounds, again these are no indication of a knowing, intentional relinquishment of
these constitutional guarantees by appellant, and ,
this court should determine the issue on the merits.
The protective policy of the Fourth Amendment
is directed to the protection of personal privacy.
That aim is easy to overcome by sham arrests used
as pretexts for general exploratory searches, based
on suspicion, seeking evidence to link one to an
w-rrelated crimeo

Traffic arrests are an ideal medium

to accomplish these ends because of their broad scope
and the fact that they can be very technically applied
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'/ c.:-,ose desirous of effecting and arrest as a means
Oi_

3ccomplishing an ulterior end.

L:i_~,-o_._:.: ::._c

To allow the

arrest to be thus used is to.drive a hugh

,J._>-::c:;e into the Fourth Amendment's protected area 0
::::or.1e 1 a ti tu de must be given, and some exceptions made,
c...o

~:-;.

"'.:he dnmk driving area, from the practical

c:--,::'orce:c,ent standpoint, but the circumstances
'.-;.er2 show blantant abuse of the device, and appellant's
co~viction

should not be allowed to stand.

CONCI..USION
Appellant submits that the burglary conviction
s~ould

be reversed, as the two searches and seizures

vx°:re illegal and evidence essential to his conviction

wc,s obtained thereby and should have been excluded.
Ee rurther submits that if either or both of the
searches and seizures is determined to have been
i~:egal

the same result should follow.

Appellant submits that should this court fail
to find the searches and seizures illegal, the
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co~.viction

for grand larceny should still be reversed

bcc3use of the plain and palpable error in the
grand larceny instruction by the trial court.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD N. BOYCE
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